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Abstract: Driven by the desire to 
stimulate the collective intellect 
of the interwar Canadian military, 
E.L.M. Burns constantly expounded 
solutions to the problems of modern 
warfare. Within the pages of the 
Canadian Defence Quarterly, Burns 
found a forum in which he could 
develop, discuss, and disseminate his 
views on mechanized and armoured 
warfare. As one of his most significant 
contributions to the CDQ, Burns 
defended the core argument that 
all-arms fighting formations with a 
nucleus of highly mobile armoured 
units should be organized based upon 
the fundamental principles of balance 
and flexibility.
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, E.L.M. Burns was 
by far Canada’s most important 
military thinker. His writings for the 
Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ) – 
the semi-official service journal of 
the interwar Canadian military – 
appear in almost every issue from 
1924 until 1939, and include over a 
dozen articles and book reviews.2 As 
Bernd Horn and Michel Wyczynski 
argue, Burns “represented an avant-
garde philosophy that promoted 
professional discourse, debate, and 
progressive thought.”3 His final 
articles in the CDQ, published just 
prior to the outbreak of the Second 
World War, “can justly be put in 
the same category as the writings 
on armoured warfare of Charles 
de Gaulle or Heinz Guderian.”4 In 
this regard, an analysis of Burns’ 
contributions to the CDQ offers 
important insights into his intellectual 
development over the course of 
the interwar years. From 1924 to 
1939, Burns sought to stimulate the 
collective intellect of the Canadian 
military through a literary barrage 
exploring the uncertain future of 
mechanized warfare. Without a 
doubt, “A Division That Can Attack,” 
appearing in the April 1938 issue 
of the CDQ, marked the pinnacle 
of Burns’ interwar intellectual 
progression. The arguments he put 
forth garnered considerable attention 
from Captain Guy Simonds, sparking 
a debate between the two future 
corps commanders unprecedented 
within the pages of the CDQ. Yet 
while Simonds’ arguments appeared 
as part of his first contributions to 
the journal, the thought process by 
which Burns built his arguments can 
be traced throughout his previous 
writings. In this regard, by examining 
Burns’ military-intellectual work, 
one can extract a core argument 
which was central to his theory on 
the organization of mechanized 
forces in modern warfare: that 
fighting formations with a nucleus 
of highly mobile armoured units 
should be organized based upon the 
fundamental principles of balance 
and flexibility. 
Burns’ writings were based on a 
fundamental belief that methodical 
thinking could help prepare soldiers 
for the uncertainties of mechanized 
warfare. In 1926, he wrote:
all it is hoped to do is to enunciate 
certain problems which soldiers will 
have to face in the next war. Though 
the massed brain power of the 
Canadian militia may not suffice to 
find solutions, at any rate, when war 
does come, those who have thought 
about the problems will be better able 
to face them than if they presented 
themselves entirely strange, bristling 
with the menace of the unknown.5 
Douglas Delaney observes that 
Burns struggled with one of the most 
serious problems of modern warfare: 
“how did one restore manoeuvre to a 
battlefield dominated by firepower?”6 
To come to terms with this problem, 
Burns turned to the most recent 
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be so costly as a military anachronism.”
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developments in mechanization 
and armoured theory available 
at the time.7 Indeed, as Horn and 
Wyczynski argue, “undeniably, his 
thoughts were heavily influenced by 
the work of J.F.C. Fuller who was both 
a soldier and military theorist.”8 Of 
Fuller – who advocated that armour 
be adopted as the decisive offensive 
arm in modern warfare9 – Burns 
wrote, “his output of ideas seems 
to be unlimited. Some may be too 
radical, some may be fundamentally 
wrong, but all are suggestive, and 
with his central idea, which is ‘think 
ahead: of the next war rather that 
the last one, or the last dozen,’ 
surely no one can disagree.”10 Of 
another famous soldier-strategist, 
B.H. Liddell Hart, Burns stated 
that “Captain Hart is always lucid 
and readable, and the ideas he sets 
forth, even if they do not at once win 
acceptance, usually stir the sluggish 
cerebrum of the militaire, so that he is 
moved to denounce their expounder 
as a heretic and scoundrel, and 
possibly even to examine realistically 
his own articles of faith whose truth 
is impugned.”11 Burns drew upon 
the work of his British intellectual 
colleagues, assimilated what lessons 
he could, analyzed their importance, 
and synthesized new conclusions 
in relation to his own concepts of 
mechanization. In this way, Burns 
developed his own theories on 
mechanization, centred on well-
reasoned assumptions which would 
allow armoured formations and their 
commanders to respond to a wide 
range of tactical contingencies.
Mechanization, and its ability to 
restore manoeuvre on the battlefield, 
was the major focus of Burns’ writing. 
This focus largely stemmed from his 
experiences in the First World War. 
As Horn argues, this experience “was 
key to his philosophical evolution in 
thinking about military operations.” 
As a signals officer and staff learner, 
his wartime service “entrenched in 
his thinking a belief in the necessity 
for mobility and speed as the key to 
modern warfare.”12 As Burns himself 
argued, “to attack successfully, 
the assaulting troops need all their 
vigour, all their vital force. If they 
are exhausted by struggling through 
mud, the drive to break through 
the enemy’s resistance, and more 
important, to exploit their gains, 
will not be there.”13 As Burns saw 
it, effective modern military forces 
depended on “a highly mobile arm, 
to reconnoitre, protect the slower 
moving masses of infantry and 
artillery, hold rear-guard positions 
up to the last moment in retreat and 
[pursue an enemy in] victory…”14 
As these tasks were traditionally 
undertaken by the cavalry, it was 
this arm that Burns determined 
to modernize, or, more correctly, 
mechanize. In his first article written 
for CDQ, Burns stated that “we are 
told that it should be every soldier’s 
aim to make the national army 
more efficient. It might be argued 
that it is our duty to attempt to 
imagine something better than the 
cavalry, as we know it, and then to 
endeavour to cause our imagination 
to take concrete form.”15 For Burns, 
“imagining something better” called 
for “a machine to convey troops, 
which will be capable of going 
anywhere a horse can, and of moving 
at about the same speed.”16 Instead 
of shock action, these highly mobile 
machines were to be used as weapons 
for reconnaissance, flank protection, 
screening, and delaying action. 
As Delaney argues, this “cavalry 
machine,” as Burns proposed it, 
“was not a tank. It was something 
altogether separate, yet a necessary 
complement to the new tank arm.”17 
However, as the technology 
of armoured vehicles grew more 
advanced,  so  too  did  Burns ’ 
thinking. Burns soon shifted his 
focus from “mechanized cavalry” 
to an emphasis on highly mobile 
tanks being used to destroy an 
enemy’s main defensive positions. 
The increased armour, mobility, and 
fire power of these machines would 
also allow armoured forces to push 
through defences and wreak havoc 
on an enemy’s command and control 
nodes, and logistic networks. These 
views were published as a winning 
response to the CDQ’s 1932 Essay 
Competition.18 Building upon his 
previous writings, Burns argued 
that “operations against the rear 
by a force of medium tanks (which 
must be accompanied by light tanks 
and supporting weapons) [would] 
be a major threat to an army.”19 To 
defend against such threats, Burns 
proposed the use of “mechanized 
cavalry” units as a protective screen 
“to give warning of enemy attack, 
to maintain contact with invading 
forces and delay their advance.”20 In 
this regard, a division needed flexible 
mobile units capable of both offensive 
and defensive actions. 
By the time Burns wrote “A 
Division That Can Attack” in 1938, 
his theories regarding the tactical 
employment of armoured vehicles 
had been firmly established. His 
article was a response to the British 
Army’s massive reorganization of 
its fighting formations which took 
place between 1936 and 1938 and 
established two separate divisional 
structures – the mobile division and 
the infantry division. On the one 
hand, the mobile division consisted 
of two mechanized cavalry brigades 
of light tanks, one tank brigade 
of medium tanks, two motorized 
infantry battalions, and two artillery 
regiments. “Its purpose was to exploit 
through any breach in the enemy’s 
line and deep into his defences.”21 
The mobile division was designed 
to replace the old cavalry division 
with increased speed, range of action, 
and striking power, and was to be 
Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns as 
commander of 1st Canadian Corps in 
Italy, March 1944.
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employed in cooperation with other 
equally mobile troops.22 The actual 
breaching of the enemy’s main 
defensive line was to be undertaken 
by the infantry division. By 1938, 
these divisions had been reorganized 
to include three infantry brigades 
without any inherent armoured 
support.23 This support would be 
provided externally by the heavy 
infantry tanks of the Army Tank 
Brigade,24 which were to be utilized 
“acting independently but in tactical 
co-operation with the efforts of the 
other arms.”25 These tanks were to use 
their armour and fire power to break 
the crust of an enemy’s defences, 
“and so give to attacking infantry 
another, and by far the most effective 
means of overcoming hostile machine 
guns.”26 However, Burns believed 
“that the idea of separate infantry 
tanks, held in an army tank brigade 
was a ‘retrogression in tactical ideas’ 
and sure to reduce both the mobility 
and tempo of battle.”27 
For Burns, the major problem 
with the 1938 British reorganization 
was the creation of two separate 
divisions with two distinct tasks – an 
assaulting arm to fight the “break-
in battle,” and a pursuit arm to 
exploit the assault in the “break-
through battle.” At its root, the British 
Army’s reorganization flew in the 
face of Burns’ notions of balance and 
flexibility. In Burns’ mind, it made no 
sense to establish separate divisional 
structures when successful offensive 
operations were contingent upon the 
ability to assault, exploit, and defend 
as the situation dictated. Rather, 
Burns saw the “break-in” and “break-
through” as one fluid operation, 
where a fighting formation had to be 
able to do both in order to achieve an 
offensive victory. Therefore, Burns 
proposed an organization “based on 
a balance of arms that afforded every 
division the ability to attack, pursue, 
defend, or withdraw.”28
Essentially, Burns argued that 
tanks should form the principal 
assaulting arm, responsible for 
carrying out two core functions 
within a balanced, all-arms division. 
The first was to reach a position 
where “the superior power of the 
attacker threatens the defender with 
annihilation, so that he may run away 
or surrender.”29 Once a defender’s 
main line of resistance was broken, 
however, Burns argued that “the 
enemy will not be finally defeated 
until the cohesion of his force is 
broken up. With modern armies, this 
means that the defender’s artillery 
zone must be reached and the guns 
captured soon after the assault is 
launched.”30 The fulfilment of these 
two tasks would ultimately result 
in an offensive victory; to do this, 
offensive power had to be based 
on hard-hitting, mobile forces. As 
Burns argued, the modern defence 
“owes its tactical superiority over the 
offensive to the fact that the attacker 
has to expose himself in order to 
advance, and presents a good target 
to the defender who is in a carefully 
concealed and usually fortified 
position.”31 However, Burns went 
on to argue that “if the attack gets 
close enough to locate the opposition 
properly, [the defence] can generally 
be overcome.” 32 Consequently, 
Burns advocated the mixed tank 
battalion as the primary assault 
force, with “the medium tank as 
the principal engine of assault, 
complemented by the number of light 
tanks which experience has shown 
to be needed for reconnaissance and 
protection.”33 While the medium tank 
of the mixed battalion provided the 
means of rapidly assaulting main 
defensive positions, lighter tanks 
would provide reconnaissance and 
an ability to quickly pursue an 
enemy retreat.34 However, in 1937, 
Burns argued that “once tanks come 
up against a properly organized 
defence, they will never overcome it 
without strong artillery support.”35 
Therefore, to provide the necessary 
fire-support for these mobile forces, 
Burns proposed a separate artillery 
arm under centralized army control, 
firing on predetermined programs, 
with only one-third of the guns under 
command of the fighting formation.36 
With armour acting as the assault and 
exploitation arm, Burns argued that 
the primary role of the infantry was 
“to take over, consolidate and defend 
the positions won by the tanks, so as 
to provide a solid base for a further 
bound.”37 Based on the cumulative 
effects of their capabilities, these 
four arms – medium and light tanks, 
artillery, and infantry – made up the 
composition of Burns’ assault force.
Yet Burns also took into account 
the defensive functions required of 
fighting formations, arguing that an 
ability to counterattack was vital. 
This concept was congruent with his 
thinking prior to 1938, in which he 
argued that “armoured cars [or light 
tanks] will generally make use of their 
mobility to take a wide sweep and 
attack the communications well in 
the rear. They are likely to avoid the 
area immediately behind the fighting 
troops – say for ten miles behind the 
front line – so as not to run afoul 
of numerous anti-tank weapons, or 
worse, enemy armoured fighting 
vehicles [AFVs].”38 Burns further 
argued that heavier tanks would also 
make their appearance in an army’s 
rear areas “with the intention of 
finally cutting the communications, 
while opposing infantry divisions 
are at grips with each other; in 
short, as a manoeuvre [arm] in the 
decisive battle.”39 Burns also held 
the concept “that given a theatre 
suitable for AFVs, in a war where the 
two armies are nearly numerically 
equal, but where one side has tanks 
and an armoured force organized 
for independent operations, while 
the other has no means of combating 
Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds as 
commander of 2nd Canadian Corps in 
Northwest Europe, 1944-45.
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AFVs except guns and infantry anti-
tank weapons, the side with the AFVs 
will win with ease.”40 For this reason, 
Burns argued that a formation’s 
ability to counterattack effectively an 
opposing force was contingent upon 
its own employment of armour. For 
Burns, the counterattack became “the 
offensive in miniature; the medium 
tanks will fill the principal role in 
this, supported by the other arms.”41 
As such, Burns stated that “the same 
four categories of troops – light 
and medium tanks, infantry and 
artillery – can perform the defensive 
functions as well as the offensive 
ones.”42 
To give these troops the greatest 
degree of flexibility, Burns suggested 
that the cooperating arms be grouped 
within the division, rather than the 
brigade, “because the tanks will 
usually have a mobile role, while that 
of the infantry except for intervals 
of movements from one position 
to another will be static.” As the 
distance between mobile forces 
and those in stationary positions 
would often be considerable, Burns 
argued that it would be difficult 
for the brigadier to tend to both 
at once.43 The balanced, all-arms 
flexibility of a division, therefore, 
would allow it to perform its essential 
offensive tasks, while at the same 
time ensuring its own defensive 
lines were secure. Ultimately, Burns 
argued that “a division organized 
as suggested…would be practically 
as mobile as the ‘Mobile Divisions’ 
of continental armies. But it would 
have greater assaulting power, and 
could confirm by a shattering attack 
any strategical advantage which 
mobility had gained. In a defensive 
role it would be at least as powerful 
as our present division, and in the 
offensive, more so.”44
The article “A Division That 
Can Attack” received immediate 
criticism from Captain Simonds. 
In the very next issue of the CDQ, 
Simonds wrote a rebuttal entitled 
“An Army That Can Attack – A 
Division That Can Defend.” The 
focus of Simonds’ criticism was not so 
much towards the technical aspects 
of Burns’ armoured formation, but 
its proposed organization. Simonds 
wrote:
Col. Burns ignores the “specification 
stage” and plunges into the “design 
stage,” the reorganization of the “line 
of battle” division, on the assumption 
that we require a division capable of 
taking the offensive “under its own 
steam.” Because he has ignored what 
is probably the most vital stage...he 
has laboured and brought forth the 
unwanted brain child – “A division 
that can attack.”45 [emphasis in 
original]
At its basic level, Simonds’ 
argument was that “the offensive 
weapons – the ‘hitting-power’ – of a 
British Army will be limited. The bulk 
of this hitting-power should be at the 
disposal of the highest commander 
who can control the battle – not 
arbitrarily divided between divisions 
in ‘penny packets.’”46 Therefore, 
Simonds argued that “the basic 
formation for defence should be a 
‘division that can hold,’” while “the 
bulk of the offensive elements should 
be at the disposal of the Commander-
in-Chief to sub-allot in accordance 
with his plan.”47 
If one area of agreement could be 
found between Burns and Simonds, 
it was that both recognized the 
importance of striking the main 
offensive blow to an enemy at a single 
decisive point. Simonds argued that 
“once the requirements of security 
have been met for the Commander-
in-Chief’s main offensive, intended 
to be the decisive coup-de-grace, every 
ounce of hitting-power should be 
concentrated.”48 Similarly, Burns 
argued that concentration – bringing 
superiority of force to bear at a 
decisive point – was a fundamental 
principle of war, one which should 
form the basis of a commander’s 
offensive plan.49 In 1930 he wrote,
the student of war should first 
learn (as Napoleon did) how he 
can overcome resistance at a point, 
which will be by concentrating 
superior forces against the enemy 
at that point. Two to one? Three to 
one? Four to one? What must be the 
ratio of superiority in men, guns, 
tanks, airplanes or what not, to be 
practically sure of success? That is the 
question he must be able to answer. 
When he can answer it, he will have 
something to build on.50 
Burns also agreed with Simonds 
that this principle was contingent 
on the necessity of establishing 
security to prevent interference by the 
enemy.51 However, unlike Simonds, 
Burns seemed to have understood 
that in order to maintain effective 
security – in essence, taking away 
the enemy’s ability to grasp the 
initiative – constant pressure had 
to be applied to keep the enemy 
guessing as to where the decisive 
blow would be struck.52 This concept 
was expressed by another of the 
CDQ’s contributors, who in 1936 
wrote that “concentration is not 
so much a matter of the collection 
of troops at one point but of their 
distribution in order to force their 
opponent to adopt an even greater 
dispersion of his strength. It is 
calculated distribution of force for 
a concentrated purpose.”53 On the 
mobile battlefield that both Burns and 
Simonds envisioned for the future, 
it stood to reason that highly mobile 
units would be required to apply 
constant pressure against an equally 
mobile enemy, even in times of static 
warfare.
As a rebuttal to Simonds’ “An 
Army That Can Attack – A Division 
That Can Defend,” Burns produced 
his last contribution to the CDQ before 
the outbreak of the Second World 
War,the article entitled “Where Do 
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the Tanks Belong?” He was critical 
of Simonds’ assertion that allowing 
an all-arms division the inherent 
hitting-power of an army was “penny 
packeting” resources. Burns noted 
that “the theory of centralized control 
of all ‘offensive’ arms in order to 
effect the maximum economy of force 
is superficially attractive, but it does 
not take sufficient account of the 
other principles of security and co-
operation.”54 [emphasis in original]. 
He went on to argue that,
in rapidly-moving warfare, when a 
division may have to advance, attack, 
retire, defend and guard in various 
directions in the space of a few days, 
it will be extremely difficult for a 
higher commander to distribute and 
redistribute his ‘offensive’ weapons 
in time to meet the needs of the 
changing situations. This is not to 
say that there should be no G.H.Q. 
[General Headquarters] reserve of 
such arms, but that they will probably 
be more effectively employed if the 
bulk of them form part of the normal 
divisional organization.55
Burns had first articulated 
these ideas in a 1937 article entitled 
“Theory of Military Organization.” 
Because he believed that the tactical 
situation in mobile warfare could 
change so rapidly, Burns argued that 
“units of the various arms must be 
grouped together in formations in 
such proportions that in co-operation 
they will be able to exercise the 
greatest total effect.”56 He went on 
to argue that the proportion of these 
units within their fighting formation 
must be “determined with reference 
to the principal or decisive arms, 
defined as those whose primary roles 
is to close with the enemy, to seize and 
occupy points of advantage, or to defend 
them.”57 [emphasis added]. By 1937, 
and certainly by 1938, Burns had 
come to regard the principal arm 
as the mixed tank battalion.58 His 
organization of these battalions into 
a balanced, all-arms fighting division, 
therefore, was in response to the 
flexible nature of mobile warfare as 
he foresaw it. 
Based upon the very nature of 
the Burns-Simonds debate, it would 
appear that the tactical philosophies 
of the two future corps commanders 
differed fundamentally in regards to 
the offensive. While Burns saw the 
“break-in” and “break-through” as 
one fluid operation, Simonds, in his 
final contribution to the CDQ outside 
of his debate with Burns, had argued 
that “exploitation is hardly a part 
of the attack proper, but rather the 
advantageous use of a favourable 
opportunity created by the attack.”59 
However, Burns’ core disagreement 
with Simonds’ arguments was the 
idea that the commander-in-chief 
would always have the necessary 
information – or the tactical or 
operational initiative – to ensure that 
“for the main offensive battle a highly 
centralized control may be exercised 
over those elements upon which the 
success of the operation depends.”60 
Burns challenged this assumption in 
his rebuttal to Simonds, stating that 
“the theory of reserving all tanks for 
decisive roles breaks down when 
the enemy has the initiative, for it 
is then impossible to tell what the 
decisive time or place will be – until 
the decisive moment has passed.”61 
Balance and flexibility within the 
division became central. It was this 
point which separated the quality 
of their arguments. While Simonds 
seemingly assumed a greater level 
of situational awareness for the 
army commander than was possible 
at that time, Burns considered 
one of the fundamental tenets of 
warfare: that the enemy always 
has a “vote.” Therefore, as one of 
his most significant contributions 
to the CDQ ,  Burns proposed a 
divisional organization based upon 
a grouping of capabilities – light 
and medium tanks, infantry, and 
artillery – which would yield to army 
commanders the flexibility needed to 
respond to a wide range of battlefield 
contingencies. In this regard, Burns 
defended the core argument that 
all-arms fighting formations with a 
nucleus of highly mobile armoured 
units should be organized based 
upon the fundamental principles of 
balance and flexibility.
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Dear Sir,
Antonia Weetman’s  art ic le “Dieppe  f rom a  German 
Perspective – German Second World 
War Art in the Collection of the 
Canadian War Museum” (Autumn 
2012) provided a refreshing view of 
some of the imagery associated with 
that fateful raid. I was particularly 
impressed with the way in which 
Franz Martin Lunsworth’s artwork 
“German Soldier Rendering Aid” 
and “Carrying the Wounded” 
had captured the fine details of 
the uniforms and equipment and 
how Wilhelm Strauss recorded 
the recovery of a disabled 40-ton 
Churchill  tank off the Dieppe 
beach by two German 18-ton Famo 
halftracks in his work “Destroyed 
Tanks Being Salvaged.”
 It is uniform details that also 
reveal that P.K. Muller-Gera’s 
carbon, pencil and ink on paper 
work “Prisoners of War Guarded 
by German Soldiers” is not from 
the Dieppe Raid. The POWs in this 
artwork are clearly wearing bush 
jackets as opposed to battledress 
Tunics which places the subjects of 
the artwork in the Mediterranean 
Theatre rather than Northwest 
Europe.
 Bush jackets were a light tan or 
khaki drill coloured cotton garment 
that was designed for wear in hot 
climates. These jackets incorporated 
both chest and waist pockets and were 
not authorized for wear in the United 
Kingdom or Northwest Europe. They 
were worn by Commonwealth forces 
in North Africa and throughout 
the Sicily and Italian campaign. 
Canadians were issued this type of 
uniform for the invasion of Sicily in 
1943, the same year in which Muller-
Gera’s work is dated.
 Battledress, on the other hand, 
was a khaki drab woollen garment that 
was designed for year-round wear in 
the United Kingdom and Northwest 
Europe. Easily recognized, this short, 
waist-length tunic with only two 
chest pockets was considered both 
fashionable and practical having been 
based on contemporary ski clothing. 
Franz Martin Lunsworth, “Carrying 
Wounded” on page 51 clearly shows 
the details of the battledress on the 
Canadian POWs.
 An accurate analysis of military 
materiel can add to our collective 
understanding of military events and 
how they have been recorded.
Sincerely,
Ed Storey,
Nepean, ON
24th Military 
History Colloquium
Laurier Centre for Military Strategic 
and Disarmament Studies 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
3-5 May 2013
The primary focus will be on all 
periods of Canadian military history 
– pre-1914, First and Second World 
Wars, the Korean War and post-1945 
developments including peacekeeping 
and Afghanistan. 
New initiatives for 2013
The colloquium is being run in 
conjunction with the Canadian 
Nautical Research Society conference 
which will run from 2-3 May.
A number of sessions will be tailored for 
high school teachers, university 
instructors and curriculum 
developers to explore innovative 
methods of teaching military history 
in the classroom
For full conference and registration 
information, visit:
www.canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/
conference2013
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